The Post-Genocide Evolution of Ethnicity in Rwanda 

Written by Jack Kerrigan. 

“Our never again means never again”, a defiant President Paul Kagame iterated in a message which is repeatedly driven home each anniversary of the Rwandan genocide. A powerful discursive tool in its simplicity; the post-Genocide period in Rwanda has been characterised by an ambitious nation-building programme, as well as strong economic growth which is representative of an apparently remarkable series of successes. The country has looked to distance itself from the genocidal atrocities which are barely a generation old, with reforms including the outlawing of identification through any means other than ‘Banyarwanda’ [people of Rwanda] (Hartley 2015), in an attempt to instil harmonious ties between citizens, dissipating ethnically-centred angst which was synonymous with the 1994 Genocide. However, within the narrative of apparent socio-economic development, there remain several inherent issues in that civic liberties currently dwindle, whilst there remains a systemised marginalisation of sub-sections of the population, namely the Twa minority. The purpose of this article thus is to demonstrate that whilst Rwanda has achieved remarkable change that deserves accreditation particularly against the backdrop of such recent horror, fundamental and systematic divisions remain within the nation, that manifest themselves in a widening chasm of development and ethnicism. In Rwanda, although discrimination due to ethnic kinds is forbidden, ridicule and maltreatment of the Twa continues with little repercussion. Rather than act as a cause of unity, the genocide has seemingly set precedent for an apparently perpetual form of inequality, marginalising the aforementioned Twa, as shall be discussed. This essay shall first provide some context for the topic at hand, discussing the genocide in short, prior to listing some recent successes of Rwandan society. These shall then be contrasted with the maltreatment of the Twa population – the focus for the rest of the essay, which acts as the predominant framework for argument.

To effectively preface this article, we must first consider the significance of Rwanda’s history. It should be noted that within Rwanda, there are three primary ethnic groups, known as the [Ba]Twa, Hutu, and Tutsi groups, with the first of these – the Twa, comprising just under one percent of the population (IWGIA 2019), and representing the country’s indigenous people. The genocide period lasted for 100 days, and whilst it is not this essay’s purpose to identify the causes of the genocide, nor the reasons for its ending, its atrocities are notably relevant. Although the exact figures are debated, it is widely accepted that between 250,000 and 800,000 Tutsi individuals were killed during the Rwandan genocide (Guichaoua 2019), largely, although not exclusively, by the Hutu genocidaires. Furthermore, between 10,000 and 30,000 of the Twa population were also killed, highlighting the pertinence of ethnic lines within Rwandan society both during and prior to the outbreak of violence (UNPO, 2008). 

Comparatively speaking, contemporary Rwanda is in many senses nearly unidentifiable with the nation that crawled out of the 1994 genocidal period. There has been a substantial increase in GDP from US$753 million at the end of 1994, to US$10.3 billion in 2019 (The World Bank), whilst the country’s GNI per capita PPP has increased from $350 in 1994 to $2,250 in 2019 (ibid). Rwanda’s economic development owes itself to the country’s technocratic approach in this sphere, wherein the nation saw the implementation of an effective market economy, coupled with average tariff reductions of eighteen percent (Malunda 2012). In turn, this has led to the prices of goods being indicative of real cost, as opposed to those of arbitrary nominal levels which were previously set by the governing party, meaning Rwanda now is equipped with an economic system less disposed to resource misallocation, and general shortages. Resultantly, when conflated with foreign aid and alternative forms of investment, Rwanda has achieved remarkable growth rates, which can be seen to have averaged around eight percent per annum following the genocide (Rostagno 2012). Furthermore, life expectancy has seen an upwards trend, rising to 68.7 at the end of 2018, having been as low as 26.2 during the genocidal period, and 50.2 prior to it (ibid). Thus, at first glance, such strong performance in a variety of major indicators clearly demonstrates the causation for glowing praise from commentators such as G. Ruhumuliza (2019) who described Rwanda as, “Africa’s most inspiring success story”. 

Further praise for the Rwandan government is deserved upon first glance of the country’s apparent prioritisation of issues regarding gender equality and healthcare. Just ten years after the genocide, women occupied nearly half the seats in the lower house of parliament, with women representing 70 percent of Rwanda’s population immediately after the genocidal period (Enda 2003). This commendable commitment to gender equality is similarly reflected in the nation’s outlawing of polygamy (Hartley 2015), as well as in matters of healthcare, wherein Rwanda’s Maternal Mortality Rate (MMR), has dropped from 1300 in 1990, to 290 in 2015 (Gurusamy 2018). Such a decrease has meant that Rwanda, “is one of the few countries to have met Millenium Development Goals (MDGs) 4 and 5” (ibid), which are the improvement of maternal health and reducing child mortality respectively. The latter of these is demonstrable given Rwanda’s under-5 mortality rate (U5MR) was 151 in 1990, however reached 39 in 2016, comfortably surpassing outlined MDGs. Whilst this can in part be attributed to the effect of global technological advances in healthcare, Rwanda’s 5.2% rate of reduction in U5MR is better than the global rate of 3.2% (ibid), and Rwanda has achieved the highest global average annual reduction in both the under-five mortality rate and maternal mortality rates (UNICEF 2020). Thus, by de-centralising healthcare, training local community volunteers in basic medical screening practices, and through the introduction of auditing maternal deaths amongst other practices, Rwanda has been able to better care for citizens in healthcare matters, at both individual and societal levels, whilst also accommodating a structured and apparently positively implemented gendered approach. This has led to plaudits from the likes of the South African Institute of International Affairs, who recognise Rwanda as a figurehead out of the African Group when it comes to commitment towards women’s rights (Jordaan 2019).

In further analysis upon such women’s right successes however, one may begin to notice several discrepancies in the Rwandan approach, which shall be seen to act as a starting point for this article’s discussion of an apparent ethnic divide which prevails in current society. To preface this point, it can be found that, despite the Rwandan government outlawing discrimination based on ethnicity, which shall be later discussed, there are apparent issues of discrimination when considering the Twa. This approach, which decidedly stems from attitudes toward the ethnic group, is evident in matters which include the aforementioned matter of women’s healthcare, as despite Rwanda supposedly championing gender equality, more than fifteen percent of Twa women are HIV positive and receive little assistance on this matter (IWGIA 2010), whilst Twa women also tend to possess, “a very low level of education”, and, “the women and girls suffer from sexual abuse and some have to resort to prostitution in order to survive” (ibid). Such dual standards in terms of equality of opportunity within Rwanda are thus readily apparent, as ethnicity clearly remains a matter of marked prevalence, for there is an apparent absence of repercussions for those who continue to marginalise the Twa – an issue which shall continue to be explored throughout this essay.

In extending upon the aforementioned notion of government duality in policy when it comes to ethnicity, local non-governmental organisations were forced to change ‘indigenous’, in their titles to that of, ‘potters’ (Hartley 2015), so as to formally remove mention of ethnicity in relation to the group in accordance with Rwandan law. The official purpose behind such an attempt to diminish ethnicity is, as the Rwandan constitution states, orientated on the state’s first ‘fundamental principle’, which is Article 8 of the Constitution, purporting the, “fighting the ideology of genocide and all its manifestations; – eradication of ethnic, regional and other divisions and promotion of national unity” (Rwandan Constitution), so as to seemingly champion an imbued common good. Such an attempt has seen the implementation of a national heritage termed, ‘Banyarwanda’ (people of Rwanda) (Hartley 2015), and the prosecution of those who seek to undermine such an identity, or individually proffer an alternative identity for themselves, as also discussed. Such prosecution is in accordance with Law No.47/2001, ‘Instituting Punishment for Offences of Discrimination and Sectarianism’, which underlines the necessity to “punish anyone found guilty of fuelling conflicts among Rwandans and sowing divisions among them” (ibid), with punishments including prison sentences of up to 30 years, and fines of up to five million Rwandan francs US$8800 (Thompson 2009). Whilst one may assume that the prohibition of incursions onto civic identity would promote individual liberties, for it deters ideas of harassment, the reality is a far cry from such a take, as the prevailing case of the Twa people effectively demonstrates.  

We can further this point as, despite the outlawing of inequality along ethnic lines, ethnicism towards the Twa is ‘overt’ (ibid), at times. This is demonstrable given the Community of Rwandan Potters have stated that, “a very high number of children [are] born outside of marriage, particularly to other Rwandan men who are not willing to recognise the child or its mother because of discrimination” (IWGIA, 2010).  Therefore, it is clear that the, “one Rwanda for all Rwandans” (Laws et al 2019) rhetoric is seemingly not standardised for the entirety of the nation, and rather ethnically-based differences remain a focal point of societal structures. Kinyarwandan (the official language of Rwanda) radio stations, “continue to broadcast [prejudiced] jokes insulting Batwa” (Hartley 2015), whilst the UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights took note of the continued marginalisation of the group (UNPO Report 2013), and made recommendations to Rwanda on how to tackle the issue. Thus, despite effective anti-discrimination laws existing in terms of equating the indigenous group with their national counterparts, there is little enforcement for the protection of them, with little repurcussions for both Hutu and Tutsi groups who remain, “racist in their perception of [Ba]Twa as sub-human” (Thompson 2019). In turn, there is an apparent chasm of inequality owing to perpetuated stereotypes and duality in terms of the accountability and lack of enforcement of rule of law in relation to the protection of Twa individuals.

In turn, we evidently see that the lack of existing accountability for those who commit acts of an oppressive nature effectively perpetuates the marginalisation and mistreatment of the Twa population. The actuality of the situation is that judgements as to who sows ‘divisions’ within Rwandan society (as per the aforementioned Law No.47/2001) is arbitrary given the exceedingly vague outline of the term, and is frequently taken to be instrumentalised as a method of oppression, whilst at times, blatant representations of sowing ‘division’ go unpunished. Such ambiguity is made salient having read Rwandan law which defines divisionism as, “the use of any speech, written statement, or action that divides people, that is likely to spark conflicts among people, or that causes an uprising which might degenerate into strife among people based on discrimination” (Rwandan Law No. 47, 2001). From this definition, it is clear to see how several scholars feel that the such a law is rather utilised as a tool of excessive conventional state power (see Amnesty International 2013; Reyntjens 2013; Longman 2017), owing to the flexibility with which the law can be shaped and utilised, because of its ambiguity. 

For Rwanda to more effectively reconcile the entirety of its population, a more consistent handling of civic incursions must be implemented so as to dispel continued oppression which manifests itself in an apparent duality of rule when it comes to holding those who commit acts of ethnically-driven oppression accountable. Somewhat ironically, by means of repressing individual memory via means of ethnic outlawing, and indoctrinating a blameless genocidal account, it is the ruling party of Rwanda who are most culpable of their self-imposed commitment to prohibiting genocidal denial. By banning ethnicity, President Kagame dictates mere memory to being trivialised as a source of ‘divisionism’, in turn dictating that, as Cohen (2001) argues, present-day Rwanda sees, “collective memory [be] pressed into shape by being repressed”. In seeking to dispel divisions which are not even three decades old, “the decree on ethnicity makes them all the more pregnant with mutual enmities” (Lemarchand 2009). By discounting ethnic undertones in Rwandan society, the Rwandan government does not dispel them, but rather harbours various resentment in manners which may only latter blow, “like a volcano”, as Reyntjens (2013) argues. It is thus readily apparent that by subjugating the entirety of a sub-section of the population, enmities will only continue to manifest themselves, as they have done in the form of discrimination towards the Twa.

Rwanda has seen remarkable drives of change and is certainly a country unrecognisable in comparison to 1994. Yet despite that, there is a certain degree of commonality between the two time-separated states. It remains ethnically-focused, despite official government desires seemingly wishing otherwise, as demonstrated by the duality of rule of law when it comes to the Twa population. We must accept that there are challenges in governing such an emergent body, given the insecurities that are undoubtedly present within society, yet that is not to excuse the shortcomings of Rwandan society in terms of equality and liberty, for there are certain inequalities of rule at hand. This conclusion owes itself to the mismatched scales of development, and the persecution of the Twa as an ethnicity, which when conflated with undeniable civic injustices, represents a large failing on the Rwandan government’s behalf. Whilst economic output is commendable, as are other elements of genuine positive reform that Rwanda has implemented, it must not act as a guise for the subjugation of an entire sub-section of the population in a manner which is assuredly discriminatory. 

Published 9th July, 2021. 

As published by Jack in Edinburgh University Academic Journal, 'Leviathan', in August 2021.